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The South African financial sector largely proved resilient to the consequences of the global financial 
crisis and did not experience the financial upheaval seen in advanced economies. This paper 
investigated and compared the strategic stance and actions employed by eight South African banks 
listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange in response to the global crisis. The research was 
conducted through content analysis of the annual reports of these banks for the periods 2006 through 
2011. Findings illustrated that, although structural and industry drivers played a key role in ensuring the 
relatively unscathed survival of SA banks, banks generally had a clear corporate strategic direction that 
remained relatively stable during the financial crisis. It was found that the industry was balanced in 
terms of the strategic positioning of banks. Of the eight banks, four were classified as strong niche 
players that were categorised as “defenders”. The big four banks were classified into two groups. 
ABSA and Nedbank were categorised as “analysers”, since they are generally cautious and 
conservative in their growth and expansion strategies. FirstRand and Standard Bank were classified as 
prospectors, since they tend to be more open to new opportunities. 
 
Key words: Financial sector, strategic stance, defenders, analysers, prospectors. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The first decade of the millennium has seen a number of 
events and trends that had a profound influence on 
companies worldwide. The 9/11 terrorist attacks appear 
to have fundamentally altered the global security situation 
(Argenti, 2002; De Goede, 2008; Straetmans et al., 
2008), while global climate change is putting increasing 
pressure on companies to become more environmentally 
friendly (Arrow, 2007; Stern, 2008; Okereke et al., 2009). 
Towards the end of the first decade of the new 
millennium, the global financial crisis led to a global 
economic downturn that directly affected millions of 
companies globally (Edey, 2009; Global Economics 
Crisis Resource Center, 2010).  
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Considering the effects of these macro drivers of change, 
the world is a very different place for South African 
companies to what it was a decade ago (Mason, 2007). 
During the period preceding the global financial crisis, 
South Africa benefited enormously from the buoyant 
economy. However, like all emerging economies, this 
country did not escape the negative consequences of the 
financial crisis. Although the banking system was stable 
and banks were in good shape prior to the crisis, South 
African banks did feel the effect of the crisis indirectly 
through higher funding costs and increased loan 
impairments. In spite of the soundness of the banking 
system, banks also had to deal with the systemic risks 
that culminated in the crisis. In retrospect, this was done 
successfully, given that the local financial sector largely 
proved resilient to the consequences of the global 
financial crisis and did not experience the financial 
upheaval seen in advanced economies.  
 
 
 
 
Literature dealing with the global financial crisis mostly 
focuses on the causes of the crisis (Bhattacharya, 2009), 
the impact and implications of the crisis on different 
countries and continents (Goldstein and Xie, 2009; 
Murinde, 2009), financial institutional structures and 
architecture (Crockett, 2009; Metzger and Taube, 2010; 
Zhang et al., 2009), the regulatory environment 
(Bellofiore et al., 2010; Calomiris 2009; Metzger and 
Taube, 2010; Kamhunga, 2011), lessons learnt from the 
financial crisis (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2010; Krueger, 
2009), and recommendations for the post-crisis period 
(Baily and Elliott, 2009; Murinde, 2009). Most of these 
studies furthermore examined collective reactions by an 
industry, country or continent. In order to provide insight 
into and an understanding about the economic 
sustainability of South African banks, the objective of this 
paper is to investigate and compare the strategic stance 
and actions employed by eight South African banks listed 
on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) in 
response to the global crisis. This paper departs from the 
aforementioned stream of work to provide an 
organisational perspective. The study thus aims to 
provide strategic insight from the perspective of individual 
organisations, rather than focusing on economic or 
regulatory impacts and implications.  
The paper is organised as follows: literature overview, 
which is followed by an overview of the objectives and a 
description of the research methodology; provision of 
results; discussion of the theoretical and managerial 
implications of the findings, as well as the limitations of 
the study; directions for future research. 
 
 
The impact of the global financial crisis on South 
African banks 
 
During the 2009 fourth joint European Charter - 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (EC-OECE) workshop on business and 
consumer opinion surveys, Kershoff (2009) reported that, 
unlike in many other countries, no banking crisis occurred 
in South Africa. The liquidity requirements of banks did 
not surge. The interbank market continued to operate 
normally and, in contrast to other countries, the South 
African central bank did not have to provide emergency 
liquidity. The spread between the policy and market 
interest rate also did not widen in South Africa as in many 
other countries. Almost two years after Kershoff‟s 
assessment the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
infers that, to date, it has not experienced any pressure to 
alter its monetary operations (SARB, 2011). It did, 
however, introduce some flexibility in the execution of its 
inflation targeting mandate. The SARB attributes the 
resilience of local banks to a mixture of historical, funda-
mental and circumstantial factors. Although a discussion 
of the monetary policies falls outside the scope of this 
review, it is important to note that South  African  financial  
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Institutions have been subjected to fairly conservative 
financial regulation and risk management practices within 
the context of sound macroeconomic policies (SARB, 
2011). 
The global crisis was transmitted to South Africa 
through the financial markets, international trade and 
tightening of bank lending standards. In financial markets, 
for example, risk aversion soared during the global crisis. 
This resulted in the reverse of foreign portfolio 
investments flows to emerging countries and the decline 
of cross-border lending (Kershoff, 2009). Internationally, 
banks made strategic decisions to withdraw from specific 
markets and products. Banks were furthermore required 
to hold more capital against their risk-weighted assets 
and, given the capital erosion within banks, this 
requirement not only constrained their ability to lend out 
money but also increased the cost of funding. Although 
the price and maturity of cross-border bank lending was 
affected, large South African banks were still able to 
obtain the lending they required. Nevertheless, domestic 
banks took on less funding due to the decline in their own 
lending as a result of the economic contraction. South 
African financial institutions also formed funds to enable 
them to lend to financial sub-Saharan African 
transactions (SARB, 2011). 
International trade also plunged during the global crisis 
and exports of South African goods and services fell 
sharply as a result. South Africa was hit particularly hard 
with the drop in the international demand for vehicles and 
non-food commodities (industrial raw materials) because 
these items dominate the country‟s exports (Kershoff, 
2009). On the positive side, it should be noted that South 
African banks consciously tightened credit standards 
before the onset of the financial crisis. Tightening of 
credit was done in reaction to the new Consumer Credit 
Act introduced in 2007 and the transition to Basel II 
accounting standards and capital requirements during 
2008. However, banks‟ lending contracted even more 
during the crisis period as domestic banks became much 
more risk-averse and tightened their credit criteria 
(Kershoff, 2009; SARB, 2011). The cutback in credit 
provision amplified the decline in house prices, the 
slowdown in consumer spending and cutback in fixed and 
inventory investment. These developments, in turn, sped 
up business closures and retrenchments, which led to a 
further tightening of credit standards (Kershoff, 2009).  
Without sound banking and other financial regulations, 
the domestic financial markets would have been more 
severely and directly impacted by the global financial 
market turmoil (SARB, 2011). In general, authors agree 
that the South African competitive banking landscape 
remained strong despite the crisis (IMF, 2010; Metzger 
and Taube, 2010; Murinde, 2009). Certain financial 
institutions even took the opportunity to increase their 
market share (SARB, 2011). Indeed, a joint report issued 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank during 2010  praised  South  Africa‟s  tight  banking 
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regulation for shielding the sector from the worst of the 
financial crisis. This report confirmed that local banks and 
insurance firms had remained profitable during the crisis, 
while their capital adequacy rations had remained above 
the regulatory minimum (IMF, 2010). Insight into the 
changing strategic priorities and strategic choices of 
banks before and after the global financial crisis would 
thus provide valuable direction to banks operating across 
the globe. In the next area of the literature review, we will 
consider various strategic management concepts that will 
be used in the analysis of the strategic stance and 
actions employed by South African listed banks. 
 
 
Strategy content 
 
According to De Wit and Meyer (2007:5) strategy content 
refers to the product of a strategy process. It is 
concerned with the „what‟ of strategy: What is, and should 
be, the strategy for the company and each of its 
constituent units? Boyne and Walker (2004) 
conceptualise strategy content as two interlinking levels. 
First, strategic stance describes the broad approach to 
improving or maintaining performance, while strategic 
actions describe the more specific decisions used to 
implement the stance. While this approach was used 
specifically to describe strategy content in the public 
sector (Boyne and Walker, 2004; Andrews et al., 2006), it 
also provides a useful framework for understanding and 
defining corporate strategy content. 
 
 
Strategic stance  
 
The strategy typology of Miles and Snow (Miles et al., 
1978) provided the basis for Andrews et al.‟s (2006) 
analysis of strategic stance, and appears to also present 
a useful initial structure for categorising corporate 
strategic stance. The typology includes four strategic 
types (Miles et al., 1978: 550-558), and these are briefly 
described below in terms of their “entrepreneurial 
solution”. Table 1 contains a more extensive summary of 
the strategy typologies: 
 
(a) Defenders strive towards strategic stability, and their 
main strategic aim would be to “seal off” a portion of the 
market and serve that as efficiently as possible. This 
could also be described as a niche or focus strategy. 
(b) Prospectors strive to enact a dynamic environment 
and accordingly have unique capabilities for finding and 
exploiting new growth opportunities. They are also 
described as “innovative”.  
(c) Analysers strive to minimise risk while still exploiting 
new growth opportunities. This means that they would 
focus on a strong core set of products and services, while 
striving to selectively exploit new opportunities. They will 
tend to move towards new  opportunities  only  after  their 
 
 
 
 
feasibility has been proven.  
(d) Reactors are constantly reacting to their environment, 
as they lack a proven set of response mechanisms. They 
are thus characterised by instability and inconsistency. 
Reactors can be regarded as a strategy failure, when one 
of the previous three types is improperly and 
inconsistently pursued. 
 
Andrews et al. (2006) have established that, in public 
service organisations, strategic stance could be 
associated with level of performance, for example 
prospectors tend to perform better than reactors. Table 1 
contains a more extensive summary of the strategy 
typology, indicating the main characteristics of each 
strategy type. The entrepreneurial solution reflects the 
organisation‟s choice with regard to their product-market 
domain, while the engineering solution is the 
operationalisation of the entrepreneurial solution that 
develops and finds technologies to produce and distribute 
a product/service. When the term “technology” is used in 
this context, it refers to core business processes and 
systems. The administrative solution is the formulation 
and implementation of processes that will help the 
organisation to (a) make its existing operations as 
efficient as possible, and (b) innovate in order to grow 
and evolve. Each choice of a stance or type has certain 
inherent strengths and weaknesses. 
 
 
Strategic actions 
 
In the context of corporate strategy, strategic actions can 
be used to describe the specific decisions used to 
support and operationalise the strategic stance. These 
decisions can be categorised as follows (Grant, 2010; 
Johnson et al., 2011; McGee et al., 2005; Louw and 
Venter, 2010): 
 
(a) To address new markets with the same product (that 
is, market development) 
(b) To address existing markets with new products (that 
is, product development)  
(c) To expand into new markets with new products (that 
is, diversification) 
(d) To move upstream or downstream in the industry 
value chain (that is, vertical integration) 
(e) To refocus on core business (that is, consolidating), 
for example by unbundling, divesting or cost-cutting 
(f) In corporate management, for example to make key 
changes in staff or structure  
(g) To respond directly to macro environmental changes 
and threats, for example to broaden the ownership base 
in the interest of broad-based black economic 
empowerment 
(h) In other forms of corporate combinations, for example 
to build strategic alliances and joint ventures Strategic 
actions should  be  consistent  with  the  overall  strategic 
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Table 1. The strategy typology. 
  
Solution/ strategy type  Defender  Prospector  Analyser  
Entrepreneurial solution  
Seal off a portion of the total market:  
a) Narrow, stable domain 
b) Maintain domain aggressively  
c) Ignore developments outside domain 
d) Cautious incremental growth  
e) Focus on core set of products/services  
Locate and exploit new product and 
market opportunities:  
a) Broad and growing domain 
b) Wide-ranging environmental scanning 
c) Create industry changes  
d) Growth through product and market 
development  
e) Growth may occur in spurts  
Locate and exploit new product and market 
opportunities while maintaining a firm base of 
traditional products and customers:  
a) Hybrid domain, both stable and changing 
b) Environmental scanning mostly limited to 
marketing  
c) Steady growth through market penetration 
and market development  
    
Engineering solution  
Produce/Distribute products/services as 
efficiently as possible:  
a) Cost-efficient technology 
b) Single core technology  
c) Tendency towards vertical integration  
d) Continuous technology improvement in 
pursuit of efficiency  
Avoid long-term commitment to single 
technological process:  
a) Flexible, prototypical technologies  
b) Multiple technologies 
c) Low degree of mechanisation and 
routinisation  
Aim to be efficient in stable portions of the 
domain and flexible in others: Dual 
technological core (part flexible, part stable)  
a) Large and influential engineering group 
b) Moderate degree of technical rationality  
    
Administrative solution  
Strict control in pursuit of efficiency:  
a) Strong focus on finance and production  
b) Meticulous planning before action 
c) Simple coordinating mechanisms and 
conflicts resolved through hierarchical channels  
Facilitate numerous and diverse 
operations:  
a) Strong focus on marketing and R&D 
b) Large “dominant coalition” may include 
an inner circle 
c) Decentralised control  
d) Complex coordinating mechanisms  
Create structure and processes that 
accommodate both stable and flexible parts 
of the operation:  
a) Strong focus on marketing and production  
b) Loose matrix structure, moderate degree 
of centralisation 
c) Complex coordinating mechanisms  
    
Competitive strengths  
a) Difficult to dislodge from niche 
b) Systems promote stability and efficiency  
a) Product and market innovation offer 
insulation against environmental change  
b) Technology offers the ability to 
respond rapidly to change  
c) Systems promote flexibility and 
effectiveness  
Low investment in R&D and focus on 
imitation rather than innovation is generally a 
low risk strategy  
Competitive weaknesses  
a) Major market shifts could threaten existence  
b) Heavy technological investments may 
require problems to remain familiar in the 
foreseeable future  
c) Not well suited to respond to market 
opportunities  
a) Risk of low profitability and 
overutilisation of resources 
b) Multiple technologies may make it 
difficult to be completely efficient 
a) Imbalance between stability and flexibility 
can cause disequilibrium that is difficult to 
rectify  
b) Dual technology can never be fully 
effective or efficient 
 
Source: Adapted from Miles et al. (1978).  
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stance of the firm, and will thus also be associated with 
organisational performance.  
 
The literature review provided an overview of the impact 
of the global financial crisis on South African banks. A 
review of key strategic management concepts was also 
provided in order to identify relevant measures that can 
be used as a basis for reporting organisational 
perspectives with regard to strategic stance and action. In 
the next area, we will review the research methodology 
used in this study.  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
The purpose of the research was to identify the changing strategic 
priorities and strategic choices of banks before and after the global 
financial crisis by presenting a longitudinal perspective. The 
paradigm of the work is descriptive and the study was qualitative in 
nature. The research was conducted through content analysis of 
the relevant sections (such as the Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer [CEO] statements) in the annual reports of the eight South 
African banks listed on the JSE, for the periods 2006 through 2011. 
The objectives of the research were to; 
 
(1) Identify the stated strategic stance of South African listed banks 
before and after the global financial crisis 
(2) Analyse the stated key strategic activities undertaken by South 
African listed banks before and after the global financial crisis 
 
The research methodology assumes that the Chairman and CEO 
reports present an accurate reflection of the key strategic issues 
facing banks, and strategic positioning and actions of banks in 
response to their environment. Although it could be argued that 
annual reports contain a strong element of impression 
management, we did not extend the research to include a full 
review of issues reported in the press and other media, since the 
focus was on the firm‟s perspective on their strategic stance and 
actions.  
 
 
Population and sample 
 
The sampling was based on the universum of banks listed on the 
JSE. The eight listed banking groups, namely ABSA, African Bank, 
Capitec Bank, First National Bank, Investec Bank, Nedbank, Sasfin 
Bank and Standard Bank, provided an accessible sample for the 
research. In order to provide a longitudinal analysis of strategic 
priorities and changes, the study considered the annual reports of 
all eight banks for the period between 2006 and 2011. It was 
assumed that the 2006/2007 annual reports would provide an 
indication of strategic stances and actions prior to the global 
financial crisis, while the subsequent annual reports would provide 
a reflection of reactions during and after the global financial crisis.  
 
 
Data analysis methods 
 
The research was conducted through content analysis of the 
Chairman and CEO statements in the annual reports. ATLAS.ti 
content analysis software was used to identify themes relating to 
strategy context and content. It should be stressed that the content 
analysis went beyond the mere “trivial” counting of words (Breton, 
2009: 187) to the identification of themes and categories using the 
analysis   framework.  The  strategy  typology  of  Miles  and  Snow,  
 
 
 
 
adapted by Andrews et al. (2006), aided the analysis of strategic 
stance. Banks were classified as employing a stance of a defender, 
prospector, analyser or reactor, based on the corporate strategy 
followed. Business level strategies identified, based on strategic 
actions, included market and product development, diversification 
and integration. Given the specific content, the analysis framework 
was adapted to reflect the reality encountered in the narrative.  
Annual reports have been of significant research interest to 
analyse the strategic content of banks. While the researchers 
acknowledge that annual reports are important for impression 
management (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006; Bhana, 2009) and can 
even be seen as marketing tools (Waller and Lanis, 2009), the 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures in annual reports are critical 
elements of the formal communication of an organisation with its 
shareholders. Annual reports have thus been of significant research 
interest, ranging from the analysis of presentation elements such as 
structure, use of graphs and textual characteristics (Beattie et al., 
2008; Clatworthy and Jones, 2006) to the analysis of strategies 
(Morrison and Roth, 1992) and reactions to environmental threats 
such as the pressure on corporations for environmental 
responsibility (Jose and Lee, 2007). In the annual report, the 
Chairman‟s and CEO‟s statements are the most salient forms of 
discretionary disclosure and of great importance to users of annual 
reports, such as financial analysts. While South African research 
has suggested that Chairman and CEO statements are of more 
importance to preparers of statements than to users (Myburgh, 
2001), Bhana (2009) more recently argues that accounting 
narratives such as these statements are increasingly important and 
are of critical importance to readers and private shareholders, as 
they often contain useful information about the future of the 
company. This research thus departs from the perspective that the 
Chairman‟s and CEO‟s statements are the most salient summaries 
of the firm’s perspective on key strategic issues and future strategic 
direction that they want to communicate to their key stakeholders. 
Not all South African annual reports contained a Chairman and 
CEO statement, and in these instances the most relevant 
comparable section in the annual report was analysed. Table 2 
contains a summary of the banks, their abbreviation and the data 
analysed. This confirms that the annual reports for all eight banks 
for all five years were used, and specific reference to the key 
sections analysed are included. Where verbatim quotes are used 
the abbreviation was used in conjunction with the year and page 
number to indicate the source of the quotation (CAP, 2007:13; 
Capitec Bank Annual Report, 2007: 13). The next area provides an 
overview of the findings of the content analysis. 
 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
In this area the findings of the content analysis are 
presented in two subsections. The first section presents 
the overall effect of the global financial crisis on South 
African banks and their stated reasons for weathering the 
storm, while the second section examines the strategic 
stance and strategic actions of individual South African 
banks in more detail.  
 
 
The effect of the global financial crisis on the South 
African banking industry  
 
When examining the return on shareholders‟ equity 
(ROE) of the eight listed South African banks (Figure 1), 
it   would  seem  that  the  financial  results  bear  out  the  
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Table 2. Summary of data analysed.  
 
Bank name Abbreviation Description  Data analysed 
ABSA Group 
Ltd  
ABSA 
ABSA is one of the “big four” banks offering a full range of retail and 
business services, and is majority-owned by Barclays Bank plc (UK) with 
55.5% of shares 
Annual Reports 2006 through 2011: 
a) 2006 – Letter from the Chairman and CEO  
b) 2007, 2008 – Letter from the Chairperson and CEO 
c) 2009, 2010 – Chairman‟s Statement; Group CEO Review  
    
African Bank 
Investments Ltd  
ABIL  
ABIL does not have one controlling shareholder. The five largest 
shareholders are the Government Employees Pension Fund (12%), JP 
Morgan Asset Management (10%), Investec Asset Management (6.5%, 
Eyomhlaba Investment Holdings (5%) and the directors (5%). ABIL 
positions itself as a provider of consumer credit, and with its acquisition of 
Ellerine holdings and its large portfolio of furniture retail stores, ABIL 
entrenched itself further in the consumer lending business 
Annual Reports 2006 through 2011: 
a) 2006 – Letter to Stakeholders; Strategic Review  
b) 2007, 2008 – Strategic Review  
c) 2009 – Letter to Stakeholders; Strategic Review (in 
Business Review section) 
d) 2010 – Letter to Stakeholders; Strategic Review  
    
Capitec Bank 
Holdings Ltd  
CAP 
CAP does not have one controlling shareholder, but financial services 
group PSG is the major shareholder with 34.9% of shares. The Board and 
senior management of CAP hold 24.08% of shares. Capitec is a relative 
newcomer to the South African banking scene. It emerged from a micro 
lending business background, and is known for its innovative 
management practices 
Annual Reports 2006 through 2011:  
a) 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 – Letter to Shareholders  
b) 2010 – Chairman‟s Letter  
    
FirstRand Ltd  FIRST 
The largest shareholder in FIRST shares is the RMB Group with 30% of 
shares. RMB is, in turn, owned by Remgro (25%) and its directors and 
managers (18.4%). FIRST traditionally had an owner-manager culture, 
with the founders still playing an active role in management and 
governance 
Annual Reports 2006 through 2011: 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 – Chairman‟s Statement; 
CEO‟s Report  
    
Nedbank Group 
Ltd 
NED 
Old Mutual LifeAssurance Co holds a majority of 51% of shares. Nedbank 
is ostensibly still recovering from some major setbacks (due to ill-
considered investment decisions) early in this millennium and the 
subsequent restructuring and repositioning of the bank 
Annual Reports 2006 through 2011: 
a) 2006 – Review of 2006 
b) 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 – Chairman‟s Report, Chief 
Executive‟s Report  
    
Sasfin Holdings 
Ltd  
SAS 
Most of the SAS shareholders are non-public shareholders, and 55% is 
held by directors and associates. SAS has a strong focus on heavily 
securitised loans to entrepreneurs who might find it difficult to obtain loans 
elsewhere 
Annual Reports 2006 through 2011: 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 – Chairman‟s Report, Chief 
Executive Officer‟s Report 
    
The Standard 
Bank of South 
Africa  
STAN 
STAN is one of the “big four” commercial banks. 20% of STAN is owned 
by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and 13% by the Public 
Investment Corporation. About 48% of STAN shareholders are foreign, 
perhaps accounting for the recent drive to expand beyond South African 
borders 
Annual Reports 2006 through 2011: 
a) 2006, 2007, 2008 – Chairman and Chief Executive‟s 
Review  
b) 2009 – Chairman and Group Chief Executive‟s Review  
c) 2010 – Chief Executive‟s Review 
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Figure 1. The ROE of South African Banks 2006 to 2011. The ROE of ABIL declined sharply after the 
acquisition and integration of Ellerines, which has a much lower ROE than ABIL.  
 
 
 
observations of analysts that the South African banks 
weathered the storm remarkably well. While analysts 
offered their own perspectives on why this was the case, 
the views of the Chairpersons and CEOs of the banks 
were also insightful in this regard.  
The strong and rigorous regulatory framework enforced 
by the South African Reserve Bank was often cited as a 
cornerstone of the relatively stability of the South African 
banking industry. More than that, it provides a framework 
for building a sustainable banking business:  
 
Our governance and compliance philosophy recognizes 
the importance of ensuring continual adherence to 
legislative, regulatory and supervisory requirements as a 
critical part of effective risk management, sound 
enterprise governance and, ultimately, the holistic, 
integrated sustainability of the organisation. (NED, 
2009:189). 
 
The regulatory framework expanded to also incorporate 
more sophisticated consumer protection and other 
measures that banks had to comply with, specifically the 
National Credit Act (NCA). The NCA played a key role in 
ensuring responsible and sustainable lending practices. It 
also had the additional benefit of causing borrowers to 
behave more responsibly:  
 
An added benefit that we have experienced since the 
introduction of the NCA, has been the increasing number 
of clients who defaulted a long time ago, approaching the 
bank to arrange a settlement in order to clear their credit  
bureau records as further credit  has  been  subsequently 
denied in the market place. (ABIL, 2009:37). 
 
As a consequence of the global financial crisis, and the 
inevitable increase in impaired loans, most banks were 
quick to adapt their risk appetite and credit risk 
management systems (which were relatively 
sophisticated to begin with) while in some instances still 
growing the business aggressively, as Figure 2 suggests:  
 
Our loan book has grown 73% in this year, while arrears 
on the last day of the financial year declined from 10.1% 
last year to 6.2% this year. From every perspective, this 
has been a commendable performance. It is the result of 
tightening our lending criteria more than a year ago and 
improving our operational efficiency. (CAP, 2010: 12). 
 
The relatively inward focus of South African banks (most 
have a strong focus on the South African market) and 
focus on emerging markets stood them in good stead, as 
it reduced their direct exposure to the subprime crisis in 
the USA and elsewhere.  
Most South African banks are relatively conservative, 
have sophisticated enterprise risk management systems 
and processes in place, and actively align with corporate 
governance and industry governance codes such as the 
King Code of Corporate Governance and the provisions 
of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision. The 
result is that no South African bank risked everything in 
the pursuit of short-term results:  
 
Fortunately, Southern African banks showed some 
restraint and  no  South  African  bank  ever  risked   “the  
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Figure 2. Loans and advances of South African Banks 2006 to 2011. 
 
 
 
house” as some of the foreign banks did. (FIRST, 
2009:11).  
 
This area highlighted the fact that structural and industry 
drivers played a key role in ensuring the relatively 
unscathed survival of South African banks, also from the 
perspective of individual organisations. However, the 
question remains to what extent the strategic stance and 
strategic actions chosen by banks facilitated this process, 
and this is the focus of the next area. 
 
 
The strategic stance and actions of South African 
listed banks (2006 to 2011)  
 
In this area, Table 3 presents a summary of the content 
analysis, followed by a discussion of the strategic groups 
in the industry. In Table 3, evidence in support of the 
strategic stance is presented, supported by a “defining 
quote” and/or key terms that the firm uses to describe the 
essence of its strategy. The judgement of strategic 
stance is thus subjective and based on the firm‟s own 
description of their strategies and strategic actions. The 
issues addressed by the data sources used focus mostly 
on   key   aspects   of   the   entrepreneurial  solution  and 
engineering solution (Table 1). These aspects were used 
to develop a perspective on the stance of each 
organisation. 
The analysis of the strategic stance shows that South 
African banks generally had a clear corporate strategic 
direction that remained relatively stable during the 
financial crisis. No South African bank needed to jettison 
its core strategy and, while smaller tactical changes were 
required (for example, adjusting risk appetite) and slight 
adjustments of domains occurred (for example, the “big 
four” banks‟ ambitions to address the lower income 
market), the strategic direction remained intact. 
The industry also appears to be relatively well balanced 
in terms of the strategic positioning of South African 
banks. None of the banks reviewed could be classified as 
a “reactor”. Of the eight listed banks, four are strong 
niche players (two at the lower end and two at the upper 
end of the market) that could be categorised as 
“defenders” in terms of the Miles and Snow typology 
(Andrews et al., 2006). Of these four firms, three have 
carved out successful niche businesses (a narrow 
domain) in market segments that are typically shunned 
by mainstream banks. They also tend to focus on one 
core technology or approach to business, and have a 
strong   focus   on  operations  rather  than  products  and  
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Table 3. The strategic stance and strategic actions of South African banks (2006 to 2011). 
 
Strategic stance  Strategic actions  
ABSA: Overall strategic stance can be described as defensive with a cautious approach to new investments growth, which is a typical ANALYSER stance. No 
significant shift in this stance has occurred between 2006 and 2011. 
As one of the “big four” banks, ABSA is firmly positioned as a full service banking group. Strategic 
stance is described in the following terms:  
a) Market leader in retail banking: defending and entrenching this position is key  
b) Focus on diversification of income base to non-retail income sources (bancassurance, wealth 
management, corporate banking, accelerating commercial business, building a leading investment 
bank)  
c) Strong focus on Africa with SA as a base 
 
Defining quote: 
 
Last year I [CEO Maria Ramos] set out our One Absa strategy. This is significantly changing the 
way we do business and collaborate internally. It aims to achieve sustainable growth in targeted 
markets, standardise and streamline the Group, create a customer- and people-centred 
organisation, optimise our balance sheet and strengthen our risk management (ABSA, 2010:46) 
a) Market development (for example, developing products and 
services to address the entry level segment of 5 million South 
Africans) 
b) Product development (for example, development of bancassurance 
and wealth management products)  
c) Forward integration: moving upstream to provide risk management 
services (bancassurance)  
d) Consolidating: “One Absa” strategy emphasises the need for 
collaboration, integration and creation of efficiencies in the group, 
focus on strong balance sheet and risk management (quality over 
quantity), focus on customer service delivery (“doing the basics right”)  
e) Strategic alliances: strong drive to leverage the Barclays Bank (UK) 
relationship (for example, adopting the Barclays forex trading 
platform) 
 
ABIL: Overall strategic stance can be described as a strong niche in a narrow segment of the market, which is a typical DEFENDER stance.  
No significant shift in this stance has occurred between 2006 and 2011. 
Through its operating subsidiary African Bank is servicing the growing middle income market with 
unsecured credit:  
a) Limited product range  
b) Narrow focus (low to middle market)  
c) Differentiation based on pricing, service and distribution 
d) Expanded into retail furniture market, but focus on financing operations  
 
Defining quote: 
 
At the time that the group was created, the majority of South Africa’s population did not have 
access to housing, electricity and quality education, or the means to acquire these important 
building blocks to a better quality of life. One of the solutions, in our view, was to provide people 
with access to unsecured credit. (ABIL, 2010:22) 
Described as affordable, responsible, and convenient (fast, easy, accessible) 
a) Organic growth through growing the distribution network of 
branches and ATMs, product sales and customer base 
b) Market development: developing collection methods for the 
unbanked population (non-payslip, unbanked credit market)  
c) Product development: new credit card (limited product range 
remains key) 
d) Consolidating: dropping prices, adjusting risk appetite downwards, 
risk segmentation (for example, longer-term loans at lower rates for 
less risky customers), use scale of Ellerines to drive costs down 
(ambitions to be “lowest cost producer”) 
e) Acquired furniture retailer Ellerines with a view to gaining control of 
its large debtor book  
  
CAPITEC: Their overall strategic stance can be described as a strong niche in a narrow segment of the market that is a typical DEFENDER stance.  
While indications have been that Capitec are moving into higher income segments, it is still with the same stance and basic technology. Accordingly no 
significant shift in this stance has occurred between 2006 and 2011 
As the “new kid on the block”, Capitec is serving a narrow segment of the market with low cost, 
affordable, convenient, paperless and accessible basic banking services: 
(a) Objective is to hold a strong position in an underrated market 
a) Organic growth through growing and upgrading the distribution 
Rensburg and Venter         9643 
 
 
 
Table 3. Contd 
 
b) Focus is on basic banking services 
c) Narrow focus (low to middle market) = good service (no business customers, no treasury) 
d) Located near target market (taxi ranks, train stations) 
e) Uses technology innovatively to reduce back office operations, offer paperless trading, offer 
simplicity and speed up customer processes 
f) Only recently started advertising for the first time  
 
Defining quotes:  
 
Although we use plenty of sophisticated technology, the Capitec Bank model is a very old-
fashioned one. We borrow long and lend short. We avoid complex products. We have plenty of 
capital. We manage arrears zealously. These are the main reasons for our stability in turbulent 
times. (CAP, 2010:10) 
At Capitec Bank, nobody flies business class. (CAP, 2010:12) 
network of branches and ATMs 
b) Limited product development (eg Internet banking)  
c) Consolidating: low cost producer through use of technology and 
innovative pricing, “extremely cost conscious” 
  
FIRSTRAND: Overall strategic stance can be described as innovative and dynamic, constantly searching for new opportunities to grow the business or expand. 
This is characteristic of a typical PROSPECTOR stance. No significant shift in this stance has occurred between 2006 and 2011. 
As one of the “big four” banks, FirstRand describe their business model as a federal model of 
managing a diverse portfolio of businesses through the life cycle. Their strategic stance is 
described as follows:  
a) Owner-manager culture (although this is slowly being usurped by a “professional manager” 
culture) 
b) Entrepreneurship and innovation is emphasised  
c) Maximising franchise value is the goal 
d) Unbundling and restructuring of successful businesses such as Momentum and Discovery are 
part of the life cycle 
e) Strong focus on Africa with an active interest in selected emerging markets in Africa, Brazil, 
India and China  
f) Strong preference for greenfield or accelerated greenfield operations (“grow new age businesses 
from scratch”) rather than acquisitions of mature businesses  
 
Defining quote: 
 
FirstRand’s growth philosophy has its roots in our entrepreneurial culture. The Group believes that 
every expansion initiative it pursues must make business sense. A FirstRand business will only 
enter a new market if we believe its core competencies, that have proved successful in South 
Africa, can provide a sustainable competitive advantage in the new market and that they suit the 
structure and economics of the new market. (FIRST, 2008:12) 
a) Aggressive organic growth of existing businesses (for example, 
First National Bank)  
b) Market development: focus on the empowerment financing market  
c) Product development: new businesses to establish as greenfield 
operations (for example, Outsurance)  
d) Consolidating: focus on increasing efficiencies through 
collaboration, shared group structure  
e) Unbundling of mature and successful businesses such as 
Discovery Health and Momentum  
f) Replication of core competencies in selected markets  
g) Alliances with “Best of Breed” partners  
  
INVESTEC: Overall strategic stance can be described as innovative and dynamic, but the group is focused on a narrow segment of the market that it is 
protecting and growing. This is characteristic of a typical DEFENDER stance. No significant shift in this stance has occurred between 2006 and 2011. 
Investec is a specialist banking and asset management group, focusing on a selected private and   
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business client base. Strategic stance is described in the following terms:  
a) Offers a broad range of services to a narrow base of clients (depth rather than breadth)  
b) Strongly positioned in SA and UK  
c) Single, diversified business, balanced portfolio  
d) Meritocracy, employee ownership  
e) Niched and focused  
f) Growth strategy: organic growth with bolt-on acquisitions, “growing the franchise”  
 
Defining quote: 
 
Our current strategic objectives include increasing the proportion of our non-lending revenue base 
which we largely intend to achieve through the continued strengthening and development of our 
wealth and asset management businesses. Key to this strategy is our ability to grow our revenue 
drivers by generating high quality income through diversified revenue streams. We will also 
continue to focus on growing funds under management, increasing loan growth and transactional 
activity, and growing customer deposits. (INV, 2010:19) 
a) Organic growth by growing its core SA and UK operations, building 
recurring income, managed loan growth, increasing non-lending 
revenue and increasing brand recognition  
b) Product development: development of global wealth management 
unit  
c) Consolidating: focus on building a strong balance sheet and 
attaining cost efficiencies  
d) Corporate combinations: acquiring Rensburg Sheppards, N.M. 
Rothschild (Austria) and HSBC‟s private client business in SA  
  
NEDBANK: Overall strategic stance can be described as relatively conservative, with controlled exploitation of growth opportunities. This is characteristic of a 
typical ANALYSER stance. No significant shift in this stance has occurred between 2006 and 2011. 
As one of the “big four” banks, Nedbank is a full service bank offering “quality transactional 
banking”. Nedbank is still catching up with its big four counterparts after a relatively disastrous 
financial period in 2002 and 2003. Strategic stance is described in the following terms:  
a) “Vision-led, values driven” (strong focus on “culture as a competitive advantage”)  
b) Ambition to be “Africa‟s most admired bank”  
c) Benchmarking with market leaders  
d) Strong brand focus  
f) Analytical – benchmarking, scenario planning and market segmentation drive strategic decisions  
g) Transformation as a differentiator  
h) Conservative stance – “long-term view” is key  
 
Defining quote: 
 
Over the past four years we have focused on training and developing our people and building an 
organisation that is vision-led and values-driven. We are committed to using corporate culture as a 
competitive advantage. (NED, 2007:35) 
a) Organic growth of existing businesses through controlled volume 
growth, brand focus, attracting new clients and providing innovative 
new products  
b) Product development: growing non-interest revenues through, for 
example, wealth management  
c) Consolidating: focus on increasing group synergies, customer 
service, turning around the retail banking business, achieving 
synergies with Old Mutual (corporate owner)  
d) Unbundling of Business Banking as a standalone business  
e) Alliance with Ecobank, allowing seamless banking in 33 African 
countries  
  
SASFIN: The group is focused on a narrow segment of the market (entrepreneurs) that it is protecting and growing. This is characteristic of a typical 
DEFENDER stance. No significant shift in this stance has occurred between 2006 and 2011. 
Sasfin is a specialist banking group, focusing on entrepreneurial private, commercial and corporate 
clients. Strategic stance is described in the following terms:  
a) Offer a broad range of services to a narrow base of entrepreneurial clients – private 
a) Product development: development of property financing business, 
equipment 
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equity, wealth management, structured financing, securitisation, property financing, short-term 
insurance  
b) Entrepreneurial culture  
c) The key opportunity is serving the entrepreneurial markets that mainstream banks are shying 
away from  
 
Defining quote: 
 
For South Africa to succeed as a winning nation, it must foster the development of entrepreneurial 
businesses. This has become a neglected market segment particularly following the liquidity 
squeeze which has affected the entire sector. Sasfin is one of the few South African banks geared 
to providing the personalized service that this market needs and in so doing, plays a meaningful 
role in the development of the South African economy and the broadening of opportunities for new 
business people, many of whom were previously marginalised from the mainstream economy. 
(SAS, 2009:38) 
rental  
b) Consolidating by being more conservative in lending activities, 
pricing appropriately for risk (high risk = high price), turning around 
corporate financing and financial planning businesses  
c) Corporate combinations: acquiring SBM, PIB  
d) Strategic alliances: IFC (part of World Bank) injected capital  
e) International expansion with the opening of a trade finance office in 
Hong Kong, establishing Sascred in Jersey  
  
STANDARD: Overall strategic stance can be described as dynamic, actively searching for new opportunities to grow the business or expand. This is 
characteristic of a typical ANALYSER stance. No significant shift in this stance has occurred between 2006 and 2011. 
As one of the “big four” banks, Standard Bank is a full service bank. Their strategic stance is 
described in the following terms:  
a) Full value chain focus  
b) Replicating capabilities in emerging markets  
c) Strong focus on Africa (SA as a “mainstay”) while exploiting opportunities especially in the BRIC 
countries and the rest of Africa  
d) Sees the 20% shareholding by ICBC China as an opportunity to expand internationally (over 
30% of assets now outside SA and growing)  
 
Defining quote: 
 
The group has been strongly positioned in recent years to take up the opportunities of a growing 
and transforming South African marketplace. Our strategy is to serve the full spectrum of South 
African customers, offering products and services from the most basic to the most sophisticated 
financial services – and to maintain high standards of customer service and cost-effective delivery 
channels. (STAN, 2010:7) 
a) Organic growth of business volumes  
b) Market development: business banking focus on government and 
agriculture, new offerings for low and middle class segments, 
innovative products for the previously unbanked  
c) Product development: new businesses to establish as greenfield 
operations  
d) Consolidating: retrenchments, restructuring, maintaining and 
defending position in corporate and investment banking, proactive and 
vigorous risk management  
e) Alliance with ICBC China  
f) International expansion by acquiring a brokerage house in Turkey, 
establishing a representative office in Angola, merger with ITBC 
Chartered in Nigeria, acquiring CFC Bank in Kenya and BankBoston 
Argentina, establishing Standard Bank Argentina and establishing 
relationships with Troika Dialog in Russia. Several of these 
investments were reversed after 2009.  
 
 
 
marketing. However, as their results have shown, 
being a defender does not mean being less 
successful than other competitors. It could be 
argued that these niche players survived the crisis 
as    well   as    if   not   better    than    their  larger 
counterparts, counter to the suggestion by Miles 
et al. (1978) that these types of competitors would 
be more vulnerable to big market shifts. 
 
1) African Bank established a successful business 
in providing unsecured loans to the growing 
middle market, and is expanding its business 
model to the lower income groups (for example, 
the non-payslip market). Before the Ellerines 
acquisition, African Bank had the highest  ROE  of 
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listed SA banks (55% in 2006 and 61% in 2007). 
2) Capitec Bank use technology to provide basic banking 
services cost-efficiently, affordably and conveniently. 
They aim for a strong position in an underrated market, 
and their focus has paid off - in 2010. Capitec had the 
highest ROE of any listed SA bank (32%), almost double 
that of the next best performer (FirstRand with 18%).  
3) Sasfin Bank focuses on the entrepreneurial market 
that is generally avoided by the mainstream banks. In this 
niche, it offers relatively higher prices (for taking on 
higher risk). While this business is inherently risky, Sasfin 
has maintained relatively high levels of ROE throughout 
the five years under review. 
4) Investec focus on high net worth individuals and 
businesses which are less price sensitive and more 
focused on service quality, even at a premium. They tend 
to focus on growing organically by expanding the product  
range to their existing customers.  
 
The big four banks have been classified into two groups. 
First, the “analysers” (ABSA, Nedbank and Standard 
Bank) are generally focused on their existing market 
domain (South Africa, retail banking), and are cautious 
and conservative in their growth and expansion outside of 
this domain. They will tend to only expand if the feasibility 
of such an expansion has been proven and risks are 
known, and favour market development as a growth 
strategy.  
Only FirstRand were classified as a prospector, as they 
tend to be more open to a wider range of new 
opportunities. This is reflected in FirstRand‟s investments 
in successful greenfield operations such as Outsurance 
(short-term insurance), Discovery (healthcare insurance) 
and Momentum (long-term insurance) which they then 
grew organically to success. FirstRand has also not 
hesitated to unbundle mature businesses such as 
Discovery and Momentum where it seemed beneficial to 
the business to do so, suggesting that they are not overly 
protective of their existing operations.  
All the banks share their South African and emerging 
market focus (albeit for different reasons). The big four 
banks are also increasingly diversifying into non-lending 
revenue sources. These characteristics reduced their 
direct exposure to the subprime crisis and limited their 
exposure to credit risk. Some generic reactions to the 
crisis were reflected in the annual reports of all the banks 
analysed:  
 
1) Transformation and Black Economic Empowerment 
have been on the corporate agenda since the 
democratisation of South Africa, and this has not 
changed. All banks are committed to the transformation 
process, and Nedbank has even stated that it sees its 
transformation beyond FSC targets as a strategic 
differentiator.  
2) In light of criticism against bankers‟ pay schemes after 
the crisis several annual reports addressed the issue of 
remuneration as a separate  heading.  Some  banks  also 
 
 
 
 
announced their intentions to restructure remuneration to 
be more sustainable:  
 
This is the way we intend to go forward: with a substantial 
salary, reflecting the importance of the challenge and the 
size of the achievements, but no, or a modest, short-term 
bonus. The same approach is followed with the 
management team. (CAP, 2009: 13). 
 
3) All of the banks experienced increased credit 
impairment after the crisis, and all banks reviewed their 
credit policies and credit risk management strategies. 
While some of the larger banks (for example, ABSA) 
reduced their loans and advances, smaller niche players 
such as Capitec and African Bank grew their loans and 
advances aggressively (perhaps as a result of the larger  
banks shrinking their loans and advances) with no 
significant increases in impairments, suggesting that 
these banks had learnt the hard lessons from the crisis:  
 
We set stricter selection criteria for borrowers who 
needed a loan, and put emphasis on the quality of the 
employer of a prospective borrower. The results have 
been impressive and our bad debt ratio ... decreased 
from 14.5 to 9.8%. (CAP, 2010:10). 
 
However, these aforementioned issues also highlight the 
impression management (Bhana, 2009) aspects of the 
annual report. While several reports mentioned 
participation and cooperation in the investigations into 
high South African banking charges, nothing materially 
has been done to reduce these costs and banking 
charges were still on the government agenda in 2011 
(Ndzamela, 2011). Similarly, executive pay in general 
and the remuneration of bankers in particular were still a 
matter for public debate in 2011 (Derby and Anderson, 
2011), despite assertions by banks that their policies in 
this regard were being scrutinised. 
Overall the analysis showed that South African banks 
have been operating in a stable industry environment 
with a sophisticated and stable regulatory framework, and 
this stability has enabled banks to enact long-term and 
stable corporate and business strategies. In the next 
section we conclude the paper.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The research set out to understand how South African 
banks reacted to the global financial crisis by way of their 
strategic stance and strategic actions. To do this the 
Chairman‟s and CEO‟s reports in the annual reports of 
eight banks for 2006 though 2011 were analysed (40 
reports in total).  
In the first instance, it was clear that the regulatory 
environment was stable and sophisticated, and strategies 
for implementing key regulations (such as Basel II earlier 
and  the   National  Credit   Act)   to   protect   banks   and 
 
 
 
 
consumers were in place before the crisis. Therefore, the 
regulatory authorities did not have to react, for example 
by injecting liquidity into markets. Despite some criticism 
from banks on specific aspects of legislation or 
regulation, they were generally in agreement with the 
need for legislation and spent a lot of time and effort on 
aligning themselves with the spirit and the letter of the 
laws and regulations. The high levels of compliance and 
the proactive introduction of regulations and laws were of 
immense benefit to the South African banking industry. 
Other structural and industry drivers also played a key 
role in ensuring the relatively unscathed survival of South 
African banks. These drivers include the relatively 
conservative and inward focus of South African banks, 
reducing their direct exposure to the subprime crisis in 
the USA and elsewhere.  
On the other hand, the analysis showed a large 
measure of strategic sophistication and stability among 
South African banks. No bank changed their core 
strategy as a result of the financial crisis, although some 
tactical changes were obviously required. The results 
also suggested that the South African industry is well 
balanced, with no single dominant player, and that South 
African banks are generally conservative in their growth 
strategies. There are three key findings from this 
analysis. First, it is encouraging that, despite theoretical 
indications to the contrary, defenders were able to 
survive the market shift in good shape, even those 
dealing with the lower end of the market. Second, it is 
apparent that the three analyser types (ABSA, Nedbank 
and Standard Bank) follow very similar strategies, and 
the lack of clear strategic differences in domain and 
technology is somewhat disappointing. Third, it is 
perhaps of some concern that only one prospector 
emerged from the analysis and that more banks are not 
willing to expand their domains more innovatively. 
With regard to directions for future research, repeating 
similar research in other geographical contexts and 
industries may assist in developing more generalizable 
results about the role of strategic stance and industry 
structure in surviving economic and other crises. 
Research on the perceptions of potential investors and 
other key stakeholders of the role and perceived content 
of Chairman and CEO reports may shed some light on 
the extent to which these documents lower the signal-to-
noise ratio. In an era where annual reports and reporting 
practices has become so much more than just a set of 
financial results, the broadening of reporting scope to 
include, for example, risk management practices, annual 
reports have become potentially rich sources of 
qualitative information on management practices. The 
value and potential of annual reports is another possible 
area for future research.  
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